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Abstract
When a novel scientific theory conflicts with otherwise plausible moral assumptions,
we do not treat that as evidence against the theory. We may scrutinize the empirical data
more keenly and take extra care over its interpretation, but science is in some core sense
immune to moral refutation. Can the same be said of philosophical theories (or the non-
ethical, ‘metaphysical’ ones at least)? If a position in the philosophy of mind, for
example, is discovered to have eye-widening moral import, does that count against it at
all? Actual responses by philosophers to the question of whether unanticipated moral
consequences of metaphysical theories have evidential force are scattered, implicit,
divergent, under-argued, and sometimes even self-undermining. The present discussion
is, most immediately, an attempt to sort out the confusion. Beyond that, it exploits the
new perspective this question gives us on a familiar topic: the relation of philosophy to
science.
Keywords Naturalism .Metaphysics . Metametaphysics .Moral immunity
1 Introduction
To what extent and in what respects should philosophy assimilate itself to science? In
this discussion, I aim to shed new light on this familiar question by addressing a less
familiar one: to what extent if any is philosophy immune to moral refutation? Science
is, it seems, immune to moral refutation. Moral opinion, no matter how profoundly
held, has no evidential force in the empirical domain. As I argue elsewhere, even moral
realists are unwilling to use the moral import of a scientific theory as evidence for or
against it. Is philosophy also immune to moral refutation? The question has only been
addressed in a piecemeal way, always in the context of dealing with the unexpected
ethical implications of some particular philosophical position. The negative claim in
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fail to consider the question at a general level. My first positive goal, then, is to tackle
the question head-on. My second is to use the topic of immunity to moral refutation to
develop a fresh perspective on the subtle relation between philosophy and science.1
As per the title, I will talk of ‘metaphysics’ rather than ‘philosophy’. Moral philosophy
is susceptible to moral refutation more or less trivially, so I will set it aside by using the
word ‘metaphysics’, stipulatively, to describe all those parts of philosophy not generally
seen as sub-branches of ethics. Metaphysical theories in this (loose but functional) sense
can have moral ramifications, certainly, or the question of their moral refutability would
never arise; but as with scientific theories, this moral force is not overt within the theory.
Explicit discussion of immunity to moral refutation (henceforth: moral immunity) is
rare in the philosophical naturalism and metaethics literatures. There is plenty on whether
science can inform metaphysics, and on whether metaphysics can inform ethics. Science
can also have direct ethical consequences, unmediated by metaphysics.2 Harder to find is
any systematic consideration of inferences flowing in the other direction—from ethics to
metaphysics and science.3 Yet if science can inform metaphysics and both can inform
ethics, what if anything stands in the way of ethics informing the other two, by the
application of modus tollens? Raising this question has the potential to tell us a good deal
about the structure of justification across the trio of science, metaphysics, and ethics.
To illustrate how this question arises, I begin with two case studies (Sections 2 and 3).
Other examples are given throughout the paper, but these first two reveal the inconsistent
ways authors react when a metaphysical theory is found to have decidedly odd ethical
implications. My strategy thereafter is to draw on a pre-existing explanation of science’s
immunity to moral refutation (sketched in Section 4 but taken from Barber 2013), then
ask whether that explanation carries over from science to metaphysics (Section 5
onwards). No simple answer—‘Yes it does’ or ‘No it does not’—holds water, but the
investigation nonetheless pulls us towards a version of naturalism that gives a credible
account of the evidential relations between science, metaphysics, and ethics.
2 First Case: Would It Be Okay to Eat Swampman?
For our first example of ametaphysical theory (in the sense defined)with unexpected ethical
consequences, consider teleosemantic theories in the philosophy of mind. These treat the
content of a mental state in terms of the state’s function, in a sense of ‘function’ that is
ultimatelynaturalistic andnon-purposive.Teleosemantic theories are sometimes taken to fall
foul of the ‘Swampman’ objection. Swampman, physically identical to an actual person, is
produced by accident in a lightning strike that coincidentally kills the original (Davidson
1987,pp.443–4). Intuitively, thisduplicatehas thesamecontentfulstatesasordinaryhumans,
1 I discuss science’s moral immunity in Barber (2013). For some crucial caveats, see note 11 below.
2 For science-to-metaphysics, see, e.g., Hawley (2006), Chalmers et al. (2009), Ross et al. (2013); for
metaphysics-to-ethics, see, e.g., Stern (1992) (plus references therein to an earlier disagreement between
Derek Parfit and John Rawls), Conee (1999), Carpenter (2014). For science-to-ethics: even Cohen (2003),
who argues for a category of ‘fact-insensitive’ ethical principles, allows that empirical knowledge can be
decisive in the ethical domain.
3 The Harman/Sturgeon debate (e.g. Harman 1977; Sturgeon 1988) is only an apparent exception. The real
interest there is in the legitimacy of inferences from science to ethics, not vice versa. It sometimes seems to run
in the other direction because the inference-type at issue is inference to the best explanation, meaning the
debate turns on whether ethical claims can explain non-ethical phenomena.
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but teleosemantic accounts cannot accommodate this intuition. Swampman lacks the history
(evolutionary or otherwise) needed to ground naturalistic functions.
Teleosemanticists have typically responded by dismissing or overriding the intuitions
we might have about the scenario. David Papineau adopts this approach in an early
discussion. He says he is offering a scientific reduction, not analysing a folk concept
(Papineau 1993; see also Millikan 1996). But later he recounts an interesting twist that
brings us to our theme. A student asked him whether it would be okay to kill and eat
Swampman for lunch. Papineau (2001) writes that the objection ‘stopped me in my
tracks’ because ‘when we are forced to consider the ethical consequences of this
decision, then we seem to end up with the wrong answer. If we did come across a
Swampman, it would clearly bewrong to kill it for meat’ (p. 282). Overriding this ethical
intuition, as he and others had earlier overridden non-ethical intuitions, was not an
acceptable option. At first, he thought he could get around the problem on the grounds
that Swampman’s non-intentional states (its susceptibility to pain and suffering, say)
would render it inedible; but that would put it on the same moral footing as a cow, and
eating Swampman, it seemed to Papineau, would be worse than eating a cow.
Papineau eventually settles on a teleolosemanticist response to this new, moral
version of the Swampman objection. Instead of disregarding the recalcitrant intuition,
as he had done with non-moral ones, he finds a way of reconciling it with a qualified
version of his theory. He continues to claim that his theory is a ‘substantial scientific
claim’ (2001, p. 286), but rather than using this scientific status as a reason to dismiss
the ethical intuition, he says that his theory is a claim about the actual realizers of
functional roles, not about alternative possible realizers in non-actual circumstances
(e.g. Swampman in the thought experiment).
The point I want to stress here is that Papineau takes the moral threat to his position
seriously. He acknowledges the challenge generated for his theory by its apparent
inconsistency with a plausible moral claim. This acknowledgement seems to be in tension
with his claim to be offering a scientific theory. He could have just said that science trumps
ethics. No one would challenge a geological or biological theory simply on the grounds
that it has questionable moral ramifications. To put it more strongly, we would treat such
an ‘objection’ (2001, p. 282) as entirely wrong-headed. Empirical evidence, no matter
how slim, beats moral evidence, nomatter how robust. Why, then, does Papineau suppose
that the edibility worry represents a potential objection to his theory? Does his doing so
not hint at a lack of conviction in his proffered solution? It must be unclear at some level,
even to him, that he is offering us a genuinely scientific theory. Otherwise, his response
might have been: ‘Mine is a scientific theory, and so is immune to moral refutation.’ This
is what we would expect to hear from marine biologists if, in attempting to settle the
question of whether fish have a capacity to suffer, someone supplemented the usual
behavioural and neurological evidence with ‘moral evidence’ extrapolated from the
premise that it is morally impermissible to harvest and eat fish.
3 Second Case: the Moral Considerability of Counterparts
Our second case study of a metaphysical theory with unexpected moral import is modal
realism, the view that possible people, possible things, possible events, etc., are no less
real than actual ones, even if they are spatiotemporally and causally inaccessible to us.
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This has the counterintuitive implication that we are under no obligation to do, or to
refrain from doing, anything whatsoever. Or rather, it implies this when it is combined
with utilitarianism, but it has similarly troubling consequences when allied to other
ethical frameworks. This result looks like an invitation to draw a non-moral
conclusion—that modal realism is false—from moral premises. Should we accept such
an invitation? After setting out the case for the entailment in more detail, I describe two
very different ways of handling it.
David Lewis’s canonical statement of the position can serve as our default (Lewis
1986a). The core of his view is that non-actual possible worlds are as real as the actual
world but are causally, spatially, and temporally isolated from it and from each other. To
this core, Lewis adds two further pertinent claims. First, the expression ‘actual’ is an
indexical, picking out the world in which it is uttered. A person or a moment is not
made more real than other people or other moments merely by being the referent of an
utterance of ‘I’ or ‘now’; likewise, the actual world is not made more real merely by
being the possible world in which an utterance of ‘actual’ happens to be produced.
Second, occupants of non-actual possible worlds can be counterparts of, but are never
numerically identical with, occupants of the actual world.4
The troubling moral consequences for the view emerge most starkly against a
utilitarian backdrop. From Jeremy Bentham onwards, utilitarians have rejected as
arbitrary what others have seen as legitimate barriers to moral consideration. Discussing
the treatment of non-human animals, Bentham (1789) famously stated that ‘the ques-
tion is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’ (p. XVII.1n).
We might paraphrase this with: ‘The question is not, Are they actual? but, Are they
real?’ After all, if ‘actual’ is a mere indexical then the as-real-as-us inhabitants of other
possible worlds seem entitled to join non-Europeans, non-males, and non-humans in
utilitarianism’s ever-expanding nation of morally considerable beings. Awarding moral
status to non-actuals, however, results in moral paralysis, the view that we have no
moral obligations one way or the other. Any apparently utility-promoting act I perform
is matched by my counterpart’s non-performance of a type-identical act in a world that
is otherwise similar; equally, my non-performance of it would be matched by my
counterpart’s performance of it. Whatever my choice, the act will (really) be performed
once and once only, whether by me or by my counterpart, and the net change in real
utility will be zero.
There is a tempting reply to this reductio argument. Suppose we represent the
argument as follows:
P1 Nothing we do will alter the sum of utility across both actual and non-actual
worlds (background assumption5).
P2 Non-actual and actual utility are equally real (from modal realism).
Sub-conc. Nothing we do will increase real utility.
4 x is a counterpart of another world’s y iff x is similar to y along contextually salient dimensions.
5 Cf. Lewis (1986a, p. 126): ‘the character of the totality of all the worlds is not a contingent matter’.
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P3 We are morally required to perform only those acts that maximally increase
real utility (from utilitarianism).
Conc. We are not morally required to do anything (moral paralysis).
What is to prevent us from adopting a version of utilitarianism—P3, but with ‘actual’ in
place of ‘real’—that would block the reductio?
We have seen one reason for thinking that utilitarians should resist that move.
Utilitarianism is by default an inclusive doctrine, even if that calls for revisions to
our moral outlook. Recognizing non-human utility, for example, forces uncomfortable
changes to our moral opinions, but that, to a utilitarian, is hardly grounds for only
counting human utility. Likewise, we might think, for this proposal to only count actual
utility. To overcome this presumption of inclusivity and revisionism, utilitarian modal
realists need an independent rationale for amending P3.
A possible independent rationale is the principle that ought-implies-can. Since we
cannot aid counterparts—we have no causal access to their world—we have no
obligation to aid them; and if we have no obligation to aid them, we need not
include them in our moral calculations. Lewis (1986a) himself thinks the problem
sketched above only arises for a ‘pure’ sort of utilitarianism on which we are not
restricted to helping only ‘those whom [we] are in a position to help’ (p. 128). This
appeal to ought-implies-can, I believe, rests on a faulty analogy with the principle’s
familiar use in intra-world scenarios. I have relegated that suspicion to a long note.6
Here, I will simply point out that the ought-implies-can principle is readily accommo-
dated within a more fully specified version of P3:
P3’We are morally required to perform all and only those acts that it is within
our capacity to perform and that maximally increase real utility.
Replacing P3 with P3’ would not undermine the reductio argument because P3 is
logically entailed by P3’.7 I used the stripped-down version because it is all the reductio
argument requires for validity.
6 Consider A, confronted with a situation in which B and C will both die if she does nothing. A cannot save
both so must choose and is torn. Then she sees that she cannot save C anyway, whereas she can, and so does,
save B. By ought-implies-can we commend A for acting as she did. In an apparent analogue of this intra-world
scenario, X cannot save both Y (a worldmate of X) and Z (Y’s counterpart in another world). X is causally
isolated from Z’s world so cannot save him anyway; by analogical reasoning, we should commend X for
opting to save Y. But the analogical reasoning is faulty, and when we fix the fault we get the opposite result.
While the intra-world scenario has one agent, A, the trans-world scenario has two, call them X* (formerly X)
and XC (X*’s counterpart). While we can allow that X* cannot cause anything to happen in any world but her
own, she acts in a way that metaphysically requires Z’s demise through XC’s inaction (cf. Heller 2003, pp. 8–
9). A better intra-world analogue of this would have A in a position to save B but not C, as before; but A can
save B only by thereby preventing some other actual person, A’, from saving C. And here, a utilitarian (and
many non-utilitarians for that matter) would be neutral on which option A should choose. This is exactly the
wrong result if we want to argue by analogy that X* should act on behalf of her worldmate Y.
7 The entailment is rudimentary: ∀x (Fx iff (Gx & Hx)) ⊨ ∀x (Fx only if Gx). ‘Morally required’ does not,
despite appearances, have wide scope in P3 or P3’ (it is sealed within ‘F’), so the entailment is not trading on
any suspect features of deontic reasoning (e.g. Forrester 1984). Anyone nonetheless concerned about deontic
paradoxes is referred instead to the response in the previous footnote.
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Switching to non-utilitarian moral frameworks does not help here. Kant, for all that he
was no utilitarian, was not opposed to means-end reasoning or to the promotion of welfare.
Indeed, contributing to the happiness of others is Kant’s (2002 [1785]) chosen example of
an imperfect duty to others (p. 40). His view is just that means-end justifications are subject
to, or conditional on, the more familiar apparatus of his moral philosophy, not that they are
always mistaken. Kantian modal realists would thus face the same difficulty. Virtue ethics
would likewise be compromised. Virtues like kindness, charity, and justice look highly
suspect if the inevitable cost of my exercising any of them is that my counterpart exercises
egoism, selfishness, or injustice. Any version of virtue ethics that trumpets personal
integrity (‘clean hands’) over all else would be excessively smug, a vice in itself.
If we therefore accept that modal realism has difficult moral implications, what
follows? I will now describe two diametrically opposed reactions from two authors,
both of whom accept that modal realism implies what I am calling moral paralysis.
Mark Heller thinks it shows we must reject modal realism. Torbjörn Tännsjö thinks it
poses no such threat. Neither author argues effectively for their preferred stance.
Heller thinks it is a consequence of modal realism that we are under no obligation to
save an easily saved drowning child. Here is how he argues that we should therefore
reject modal realism
If modal realism commits its adherents to behaving contrary to a moral truth, then
it is to that extent immoral. And to the extent that the moral truth is obviously
true, that gives us reason to believe in the falsity of any theory that conflicts with
it. The objection to modal realism is therefore, not just that it is immoral, but that
it is therefore false. (Heller 2003, p. 3)
The force of this objection is not as strong as Heller appears to think. Of the two charges
against modal realism, i.e. immorality and falsity, the first is a distraction. It overcompli-
cates what is in fact a simple argument: modal realism is false because it implies a moral
falsehood (e.g. moral paralysis, or else Heller’s more specific example of its being okay to
ignore an easily saved child). Once our attention comes to rest on this simple argument,
however, his conclusion looks too quick; or rather, it rests too heavily on a proviso that is
never made good (‘to the extent that the moral truth is obviously true’). Why should we
not, instead, conclude that we need to radically revise our moral outlook, by embracing
moral paralysis or by abandoning some other part of our moral framework?
That, recall, would be our reaction in a scientific context. Consider modal realism’s
scientific cousin, the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics (Wallace 2012).
Setting aside differences between it and modal realism, notice how peculiar it would be
to try to settle the debate between competing interpretations by invoking moral
considerations. These would not even constitute a tie-breaker. Heller assumes, in effect,
that things are otherwise for metaphysical theories than they are for scientific ones. So,
apparently, does Lewis himself, in so far as he takes the time to address the ‘moral’
challenge to his view in a way that goes well beyond simply noting that metaphysics
trumps ethics. Lewis’s and Heller’s attitudes are not as puzzling as Papineau’s, since
they do not categorize modal realism as a scientific theory. But they still fail to consider
the possibility that, like a scientific theory, it is immune to moral refutation.
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Tännsjö, too, thinks modal realism is massively at odds with existing moral opinion;
but unlike Heller, he recommends recalibrating our ethical norms rather than our modal
metaphysics. Specifically, he claims that utilitarian modal realists can simply endorse
what I am calling moral paralysis.
Together with modal realism…, [utilitarianism] yields the conclusion that, mor-
ally speaking, anything goes [i.e. moral paralysis]. … This conclusion is unex-
pected of course, but, as such, it does not constitute any good reason why we
should give up modal realism (or utilitarianism). Utilitarianism as such is at
variance with several common-sense moral principles, but the conclusion that
anything goes is not as such at variance with any plausible moral principle. We
should not be prejudiced as to the exact scope of our moral principles. Perhaps
there are very many actions that we want to perform that are morally prohibited,
perhaps there are very few. The case where none is prohibited is a limiting case,
no more and no less. … If, pace David Lewis, we believe that we have good
reasons to accept pure utilitarianism, we may stick to it also when it turns out to
imply that we have no moral obligations. This implication makes our reasons for
accepting pure utilitarianism neither better nor worse than they were before we
knew about it, nor should we allow it to upset our belief, if we happen to entertain
such a belief, in modal realism. (Tännsjö 1987: 88-9, emphasis added)
The salient feature of this passage for our purposes is its lack of an argument for the
claim that modal realism is safe, despite being inconsistent with the conjunction of
utilitarianism and the denial of moral paralysis. Tännsjö asserts this twice in the passage
(italics) but his reasons have to do only with whether we should embrace moral
paralysis before we abandon utilitarianism. Whereas Heller, like Lewis, assumes that
modal realism is susceptible to moral refutation in a way that science is not, Tännsjö
assumes the opposite. There is a paucity of argument on either side.
4 Why Is Science Immune to Moral Refutation?
To settle the question raised by our two case studies and others like them, a sensible
place to start is with a sense of why science is immune to moral refutation; we can then
ask whether the same explanation extends to metaphysics, given parallels and discrep-
ancies between it and science. I will therefore draw on my earlier (2013) explanation of
science’s immunity to moral refutation. After describing that explanation in this section,
I will address its extendibility to metaphysics in Section 5 onwards.8
Let us return to the fish example. Suppose a marine biologist maintains on empirical
grounds (e.g. behavioural and neurological traits) that fish have the capacity to suffer.
Now imagine an attempt to refute this position using moral premises and a valid-
looking9 inference:
8 In the earlier paper, I was concerned with the question of whether science’s immunity to moral refutation
means we should be moral anti-realists. I will sidestep that metaethical question here by accepting moral
realism and simply taking over what I there argue is the only explanation of science’s moral immunity a moral
realist can accept.
9 I have suppressed the deontic premises needed to make it formally valid, which I take to be harmless here.
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To harvest and consume creatures with the capacity to suffer is to generate
unnecessary suffering; one ought not to generate unnecessary suffering; it is
morally permissible to harvest and consume fish; therefore, fish lack the capacity
to suffer.
This ethical contribution to the scientific enquiry will seem wrong-headed even to those
predisposed to accept its three premises. They do not even yield a tie-breaker. What
explains this?
For a moral realist—here understood to be someone who accepts that moral
discourse is a reasonably trustworthy source of true and objective judgements—this
is, on the face of it, puzzling. Figure 1 is a visual representation of this puzzle. Given
some logical inconsistency between a set of ethical claims (e.g. the moral premises in
the ‘fish’ argument above) and some scientific claim (e.g. the view that fish have the
capacity to suffer), why does evidence for the ethical claims (coming in from the right)
never act as a counterweight to the empirical evidence for the scientific claims with
which the ethical claims conflict (evidence coming in from the left)? In other words,
why can moral evidence not be bundled up with more traditional kinds of evidence in
the evaluation of science?
Figure 2 is a representation of my solution to this puzzle (2013, pp. 644–7). It involves
accepting a sharp division within the set of ethical judgements between those the evidence
for which is purely a priori and those that are derived from a conjunction of this first category
plus our empirical assumptions. Crucially, the ‘applied’ ethical judgements in this second
category have no evidence in their favour beyond their derivability.
Once we accept this division of justified ethical judgements according to the source
of their justification, we can see that neither source can be mustered into any kind of
counterweight to the empirical evidence for scientific judgements. Non-derived ethical
judgements in isolation, with their purely a priori support, can never conflict with
empirical findings. After all, if they had this kind of empirical significance, they would
themselves be open in principle to empirical assessment, meaning the evidence for
them was not purely a priori after all. As for derived ethical judgements, they have only
derivational support, and the source of that derivational support is, in part, empirical. To
draw empirical conclusions from them would therefore always involve circular
Fig. 1 A puzzle: why does the ethical evidence have no force against the scientific evidence?
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reasoning. The fish argument above illustrates this circularity. The derived ethical
judgement that it is morally permissible to harvest and consume fish (the third premise)
is warranted at most to the extent that we already have grounds for thinking that fish
lack the capacity to suffer.10
5 From Science’s Immunity to Metaphysics’ Immunity: Three
Possibilities
Our next task is to search for parallels or discrepancies when we turn from science to
metaphysics. This section is designed to narrow us down to three possible positions, to
be selected from in the rest of the paper. Before any of this, I will set out four working
assumptions. Any of these assumptions could be challenged but adopting them will
keep a lid on a discussion that can become very complex very quickly.
Working assumption 1: Science is immune to moral refutation.11
10 For simplicity I have ignored non-welfare arguments, e.g. environmental considerations. These too would
rely on empirical assumptions, complicating the point without undermining it.
11 Some caveats are in order. (i) Ethical considerations can legitimately shape a scientific agenda (e.g. cancer
research). (ii) Sometimes we may wish to raise the evidence threshold for acceptance of a scientific theory
because of its strong moral import (see, e.g., Kitcher 1985, p. 9). (iii) Sometimes the ideological ramifications
of a finding can legitimately prompt us to suspect that ‘decision-based evidence-making’ rather than science is
at work (see, e.g., Newby and Newby 1995). (iv) Sometimes we draw on moral psychology for evidence (see,
e.g., Rini 2013), but this is not the same as using a moral premise as such to draw an empirical conclusion. In
van Fraassen’s (2002) words, ‘once we are given the fact that the humans involved had certain values and
made certain value judgments[, …] it is clear that not values but only humans’ having values is what really
matters’ in science (p. 182).
Fig. 2 A solution to the puzzle: science is immune to moral refutation because there is a division within the
category of ethical judgements
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Science’s immunity is, moreover, strict: it is not just that moral evidence counts only a
little against a scientific position.12
Working assumption 2: The explanation of science’s immunity sketched in
Section 4 is correct.
Ethics, that is, contains an evidentially defined split between a purely a priori part and
an entirely derived part.13
Working assumption 3: If metaphysics has moral immunity, this fact has the
same explanation as science’s moral immunity.
The thought here is just that it would be too great a coincidence if, even though the
explanation of science’s moral immunity failed to carry over to metaphysics, some
distinct generator of moral immunity for metaphysics was nevertheless waiting in the
wings.
Working assumption 4: Moral realism is broadly correct.
This is the most contentious assumption, and I make it only so as not to short-circuit the
discussion. The moral immunity of both science and metaphysics is relatively banal if
we grant moral anti-realism. Plenty of people are moral realists, however, and even
those who are not can find interest in the questions moral immunity raises for those on
the other side of the fence.
Let us turn now to whether metaphysics is immune to moral refutation for the same
reason that science is. One might think that the explanation I have given of science’s
moral immunity can be extended quite easily: just slot in the phrase ‘…and metaphys-
ics’ after ‘science’, and exploit the same immunity-generating split within ethics
between its purely a priori part and its derived part. Derived ethics will now include
judgements that result from combining purely a priori ethical principles with scientific
and/or metaphysical theories. On this proposal, just as the ethics of harvesting fish can
tell us nothing about neuroscience or ethology, so Swampman-ethics can tell us nothing
about the philosophy of mind, counterpart ethics can tell us nothing about modal
metaphysics, and so on. To suppose otherwise would be to open oneself up to the
same charge: circularity. Applied ethical claims (e.g. ‘Eating Swamp-people is wrong’)
would have no epistemic support beyond their derivability from, among other things,
these self-same metaphysical theories (e.g. teleosemanticism).
This simple opening case for the moral immunity of metaphysics instantly faces two
objections. The first is that Heller, Lewis, and Papineau have all shown themselves
drawn to an alternative view: that metaphysics, unlike science, is susceptible to moral
12 The case against moral refutations of science seems to be empirical rather a priori. There is nothing logically
or conceptually incoherent about scientific theories with a value-rich ontology, but such theories have been
gradually and comprehensively phased out in exchange for greater empirical adequacy. As Wilson (1995) puts
it, in early modern science ‘the subtraction of moral attributes [led to a] new discourse of nature [that] was as
impoverished in cultural terms as it was enriched in observational terms’ (p. 212).
13 Basl and Coons (2017) offer an interesting alternative to my explanation, but there is no space here to assess
its implications for the immunity or otherwise of metaphysics.
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refutation, at least in principle. They may be wrong in being so drawn—and Papineau,
one suspects, would be happy to accept as much—but we would still have some
obligation to explain what draws them at all. They do not react with ridicule, as anyone
would to moral ‘reasoning’ about the nervous systems of fish. If both science and
metaphysics are immune to moral refutation, then either the explanations of this
immunity differ (contrary to working assumption 3) or else the explanations are the
same but some yet-to-be-unveiled supplementary explanation is needed for the failure
by Heller and company to spot this sameness.
The second objection is that placing metaphysics alongside science in this way
sabotages the explanation of moral immunity sketched in Section 4 (contrary to
working assumptions 2 and 3). A crucial posit of that explanation is a category of
ethical claims that have purely a priori justification and hence cannot come into
evidential conflict with empirical claims. If metaphysical knowledge is wholly or
partially a priori, that part of the explanation will not necessarily carry over.
We can deal with both objections if we strengthen the proposal: instead of saying that
metaphysics is immune to moral refutation for reasons parallel to those that make science
immune, we can say it is immune because, done properly anyway, metaphysics is science.
Or rather (and to avoid conjuring up unintended images of philosophers in protective
goggles), because it is continuous with paradigmatic instances of science in certain vital
respects, such as being beholden to the same standards of empirical adequacy, the same
principles of explanatory coherence, the same ontology, or whatever it may be. This
modification, this naturalism about metaphysics, yields responses to our two objections.
Regarding the first objection, hesitancy to dismiss moral objections to metaphysics
can be interpreted as hesitancy over the naturalism such a dismissal presupposes. Either
the hesitators are not philosophical naturalists at all, or they are but not dogmatically so.
Anything short of knee-jerk certainty that metaphysics (done properly, etc.) is an
extension of science will leave room for a suspicion that metaphysics is inferentially
entwined with ethics in a way that exposes it, unlike science in the narrow sense, to
morally driven revision. Such suspicions could give rise to searches for responses to
ethical objections to metaphysics—redundant searches if naturalism is in fact correct.
Regarding the second objection, once we treat metaphysics as part of science, there
is no need to worry about metaphysics having an a priori element. On a naturalistic
conception of metaphysics, the explanation of science’s moral immunity could be
extended quite straightforwardly into an account of metaphysics’ moral immunity.
All evidence for applied ethical judgements is derivational, so using it against
science—now in the wider sense, incorporating metaphysics—would be circular; and
the purely a priori evidence for non-derived ethical judgements entails that they never
conflict with science, again in this new wide sense.14
14 A more complex naturalistic position than the one sketched here is also possible. I have been envisaging an
especially empirically minded naturalist for whom the norms of scientific enquiry (coherence with other
scientific theories, consilience, explanatory elegance, simplicity, etc.) are themselves in some sense empirical
rather than a priori. The more complex position would involve drawing and insisting on a distinction,
something like Kant’s, between practical and theoretical (including mathematical) knowledge. Both kinds
could have a priori components—meaning science’s epistemic norms could be a priori—so long as there was
no chance of a priori moral norms being cited in evidence when we reason about epistemic norms. (If they
were so cited, ethical evidence in the scientific domain would become possible, contrary to Working
assumption 1.) In this exploratory paper, I will not try to settle whether science itself has an a priori element,
ringfenced somehow from practical a priori knowledge.
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This gives us an early tentative result in our enquiry into the moral immunity or
otherwise of metaphysics. Two theses—naturalism about metaphysics and the thesis
that metaphysics has moral immunity—appear to be interdependent. If we accept or
reject one, it seems, we must do the same with the other.
That naturalism and immunity are biconditionally tethered in this way is not so
surprising an outcome once it is made explicit. The biconditional leaves us with two
positions to choose between, however: endorse both a naturalistic attitude towards
metaphysics and the moral immunity that comes along with this naturalism; or reject
both. And here we face an apparent impasse: the only way of deciding between these
two options is to draw on our existing sympathies or antipathies towards naturalism. In
that case, our choices will reflect those sympathies and antipathies but will not help us
to evaluate them. This threatens to expose as mere hype a claim made at the start of this
paper: that reflecting on moral immunity opens up a valuable new perspective on the
naturalism debate.
We can get beyond this impasse, though our situation will get worse before getting
better. I am about to argue that neither of these two options is acceptable; but out of
their ashes, a third option will emerge, a pluralistic form of naturalism. Call the first two
options across-the-board naturalism and across-the-board anti-naturalism respective-
ly. Across-the-board naturalism holds that metaphysics is all naturalistic and so all
immune to metaphysics; across-the-board anti-naturalism holds that metaphysics is all
non-naturalistic and so all susceptible to moral refutation. I argue against these views in
Sections 6 and 7. On the pluralistic approach I prefer, we do not have to be naturalistic
about all of metaphysics in order to be naturalistic about some. I elaborate this third
option in Section 8, defending it against an important objection. I may appear to be
attacking figures of straw in bothering to reject the other options first, but discussions of
naturalism do tend to be conducted as if one has to be either pro-naturalist across the
board or else anti-naturalist across the board.15 It is therefore worth showing explicitly
that a pluralist stance is not merely an option, it is in fact required.
6 The Case Against Across-the-Board Anti-naturalism
The loose statement of naturalism I gave earlier—that metaphysics ‘is continuous with
paradigmatic instances of science in certain vital respects’—glosses over familiar
divisions within the naturalist camp. These divisions are about to become important.
Some variants of naturalism are more credible than others. To give two extreme (and
made-up) examples: a variant that calls for the dismissal of all metaphysical theses that
have not been semantically reduced to the principles of current physics would have
very low incredibility, whereas a version that commands philosophers to consult
scientists when their own work has non-trivial empirical commitments would have
very high credibility.
I will exploit this variability in credibility to argue against across-the-board anti-
naturalism. (This, to repeat, is the view that we should take a non-naturalistic stance
towards all metaphysical theories, and so view all metaphysical theories as susceptible
15 Papineau’s (2016) review, for example, helpfully distinguishes many subtypes of naturalistic attitude, but
does not consider whether any one of them could be apt in some metaphysical debates but not in others.
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to moral refutation.) Adopting across-the-board anti-naturalism, I will show, means
rejecting even a relatively plausible version of naturalism. I will call this plausible
version of naturalism weak naturalism to signal how undemanding it is. First, I will
explain what weak naturalism is and why it is appropriate to call it undemanding. Then
I will show why weak naturalism is ruled out by across-the-board anti-naturalism
There are various conceptions one might have of the evidential relationship between
metaphysical debates and science. Weak naturalism is a disjunction of such concep-
tions. It is weak in part because it is a disjunction, but also because it makes no overt
ontological demands (reductionist or otherwise). To see what the disjuncts are, suppose
we make a four-way division of stances one might take on the evidence-base for
metaphysics (A to D in Table 1). One might hold that we should just do science in
the narrow sense, abandoning traditional metaphysical debates as beyond meaningful
evidential support of any kind (stance A). One might hold that enquiry into metaphys-
ical topics is legitimate but only if it can be incorporated into science and dealt with
empirically (stance B). One might hold that metaphysics can be informed, potentially
anyway, by both empirical and a priori considerations, with trade-offs between these
two sources (stance C). Finally, one might think that metaphysics is a legitimate domain
of purely a priori enquiry, disengaged in principle from empirical considerations (stance
D). By ‘weak naturalism’ I mean the disjunction of A, B, and C—in other words, the
rejection of D.16
Weak naturalism about metaphysics is a relatively undemanding brand (or disjunc-
tion of brands) of methodological naturalism. Each disjunct within it, moreover,
requires metaphysics to be immune to moral refutation—or so I am about to argue in
the remainder of the present section. Weak naturalism therefore requires this too, by
disjunctive syllogism. That represents a problem for across-the-board anti-naturalism:
maintaining that metaphysics is always susceptible to moral refutation means rejecting
even this relatively undemanding naturalism, across the board.
The incompatibility of both A and B with moral refutations of metaphysics can
quickly be shown using our working assumptions. Suppose for reductio that meta-
physics is susceptible to moral refutation. Working assumptions 1 and 2 commit us to a
16 The purpose here is to divide the logical space for the disjunctive inference that follows, not to categorize
actual authors. Quine, for example, adopts A and B at different times. That said, for representative expressions
indicating sympathy for each of the alternatives, see van Fraassen (2002) (option A); Ladyman and Ross
(2007) (option B); Lowe (2006), Paul (2012) (option C); Fine (2012) (option D).
Table 1 Four possible stances towards the evidence available in metaphysical debate
Metaphysical theses are ripe for…
…empirical justification or refutation …a priori justification or refutation
Stance A ✗ ✗
Stance B ✓ ✗
Stance C ✓ ✓
Stance D ✗ ✓
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split between non-derived and derived ethics, neither of which can be a source of
evidence against science. But it is hard to see how either could be a source of evidence
against metaphysics either, if A or B is correct. Non-derived ethics is a priori, so using it
to refute metaphysics would be contrary to both A and B; derived ethics, on the other
hand, because it is derived, is not an independent source of evidence.
C’s empiricism is more forgiving than A’s and B’s, so C is less readily shown to be
incompatible with moral refutations of metaphysics. The incompatibility can be shown
nonetheless, again using our working assumptions. The short version is that if C is
accepted, any moral refutation of metaphysics would carry over—by hypothetical
syllogism—into a moral refutation of the scientific underpinnings of this metaphysics,
in violation of working assumption 1. To show that this charge sticks, I will run through
it in the abstract, then illustrate it with an example.
Suppose a metaphysical theory is susceptible to moral refutation. This refutation
would have to be a priori in nature (for the reasons just set out in the discussion of A
and B). That in itself poses no threat to C because C, unlike A and B, permits a priori
evidence for metaphysical claims. The difficulty for C arises because the refutation
would be ethical in nature, not that it would have an a priori source. This ethical nature
is a problem because, on stance C, metaphysics is evidentially intertwined with science,
so if metaphysics is susceptible to refutation on ethical grounds, so too is science—
contrary to working assumption 1.17
To illustrate the problem generated for C if we permit moral refutations of meta-
physics, consider a topic sitting within the purview of both physics and traditional
metaphysics: time. Presentism, the view that the past and future are unreal, has
sometimes been criticized as incompatible with relativity theory’s abandonment of
simultaneity (see Balashov and Janssen 2003, cf. Hawley 2006). But alongside this
alleged conflict with an empirically supported scientific theory, presentism has—or has
been held to have—challenging moral implications. Delmas Lewis, for example, claims
that it is incompatible with holding individuals responsible for earlier actions and
should be rejected for that reason.18 We can imagine stringing together these two
dialectic aspects of presentism—its empirical commitments in one direction and its
ethical ones in the other—to give, absurdly, a moral argument for relativity theory:
individuals are morally responsible for their actions; moral responsibility implies
realism about the past and so the rejection of presentism; rejection of presentism
supports relativity. There are, of course, plenty of potential vulnerabilities in this
reasoning chain. But our reaction to the argument should not be, ‘There’s a debate to
be had here!’ Rather, it should be that something has gone seriously awry. We reach the
absurdity only if we allow that the metaphysical debate is evidentially intertwined with
science in the way that C permits and that metaphysics is vulnerable to moral
refutation.
Summing up, across-the-board anti-naturalism requires us to reject even a relatively
mild, disjunctive version of methodological naturalism. It forces us towards stance D,
17 One might try to block this argument by allowing that science can inform metaphysics while denying the
converse. But this inferential asymmetry, while it would save the compatibility of stance C with moral
refutations of metaphysics, is devoid of any rationale. It would be warranted only if metaphysical claims
lacked independent, non-empirical support. While that is true on stance B, for example, stance C recognizes
the existence of a priori support for metaphysics, meaning the asymmetry would be unprincipled.
18 Lewis (1986b). Oaklander (1988) also takes the moral objection seriously enough to argue against.
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the view (which I am here assuming is relatively unattractive) that metaphysical
theories, of time say, must in principle shrink into the shadows of scientific irrelevance.
7 The Case Against Across-the-Board Naturalism
The other ‘across-the-board’ option holds that we should always go for both naturalism
and therefore moral immunity when doing metaphysics. This view faces a different
kind of problem: metaphysics is, sometimes anyway, uncontroversially susceptible to
moral refutation.
A classic illustration of this is Locke’s memory-based criterion for persistence of
self. Locke is perfectly explicit that he is offering a ‘forensic’ account of personal
identity. (‘Forensic’ in its strict sense means pertaining to law, but here we can read it
more loosely to mean pertaining to ethics.) His purpose, he says, is to understand
how punishment can be directed towards ‘the same that committed those actions,
and deserve that punishment for them’ (Locke 1997 [1706], p. 312). It follows that if
an absurd assignation of moral responsibility emerges from his memory criterion of
persistence, his memory criterion is in trouble. Suppose, for example, that a re-
formed criminal describes himself as still having vivid memories as of committing a
hideous crime, and at the same time sincerely and comprehensively disowns ‘the
person I once was’ (as he puts it). We may feel we can no longer hold him
responsible. In that case, we would need to give up on the memory criterion as a
measure of personal identity in Locke’s forensic sense (irrespective of whether we
think there is persistence of self in some non-forensic sense). Locke could hardly
shrug the objection off by pleading moral immunity when moral significance is his
enquiry’s stated raison d’être.
It is tempting to dismiss this objection to across-the-board naturalism as showing
only that Locke’s theory is not a metaphysical theory after all, but rather a barely
disguised ethical theory. Locke’s theory is not the sole example, however, and other
examples show—in a way Locke’s does not—that whether a metaphysical theory is
purely science-oriented (so that any ethical implications it may have cannot be held
against it) or ethics-oriented (and so accountable to the moral sphere) is not always easy
to spot. Such cases are therefore less easily dismissed.
Before describing two philosophical cases, it will be instructive to consider a non-
philosophical analogue. Sound level is not the same as noise level. Sound level is the
pressure of an acoustic wave, standardly given in decibel units relative to a base level of
2 × 10−4 microbars. This otherwise arbitrary choice of base level reflects human
interests: it approximates the average lower bound of human audibility. But setting
aside how it is expressed, sound level is independent of human interests and is
measurable as such. Indeed, acoustic science is integral to branches of modern
engineering unrelated to human perception, such as the structural integrity of
buildings. Noise level, on the other hand, is shot through with evaluative
considerations that render it unfit for use outside the specific contexts in which those
considerations are salient, making it unmeasurable without reference to these same
considerations. A train’s distant hoot at night may be tolerable or even soothing, and so
less noisy than a neighbour’s irritating radio, despite sound level being the same in each
case. A blackbird’s singing can delight us until we realize that it is mimicking a car
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alarm. The notion of sound level, we might say, is science-oriented whereas the notion
of noise is ethics-oriented. If someone is irritated by a ‘noisy’ conversation, it can make
sense to respond that it is ‘not noise, it is just people conversing’. The equivalent
response to a measurement of sound level would make no sense.
This sound/noise distinction is easy to miss until it is pointed out. In metaphysics,
too, it may not be obvious whether we are trading in noise-like or sound-like concepts.
The philosophies of mind and language have both been seen by a majority of
practitioners as essentially naturalistic endeavours, properly trading only in science-
oriented, sound-like concepts. And yet examples can be found of ethical drivers that sit
uneasily with this orthodoxy.
An example in the philosophy of mind is Andy Clark and David Chalmers’
suggestion that mental representations can sit outside our craniums. The evidential
pros and cons they offer for the extended-mind thesis do not include any moral ones.
Others have spotted, however, that their thesis makes some instances of data-theft
equivalent to kidnapping, or that deliberately wiping a person’s digital devices would
be quasi-murderous rather than simply damaging of property. Both considerations raise
the possibility of taking a forensic approach to tracing the mind’s borders. On this
approach, we would aim to include whatever we think warrants protection through
personal privacy or anti-assault legislation. Any specification of these borders would
then be susceptible to ethical evaluation.19
In philosophy of language and linguistics, the topic of the semantics/pragmatics
boundary—of what it is, of where it is, of whether it is—is usually approached with
explanatory payoff as the accepted arbiter: in effect, the better the empirical fit, the
better the account.20 Jennifer Saul, however, has recently looked at the boundary
through an ethical lens. Just as Locke wanted a theory of the same-person/different-
person distinction that mapped onto the ethical contrast between being and not being
culpable, Saul wants a version of the semantics/pragmatics boundary that maps onto the
ethical contrast (or alleged contrast) between lying and merely misleading. Moreover,
she argues, no existing account of the boundary is up to the task, so she offers a new
one. In ecumenical spirit, Saul does not insist that these other accounts are misguided.
They are just designed to different ends. In her opinion, then, this is less an instance of a
hitherto ethical dimension suddenly being revealed as key to a debate, and more a
conscious change of topic.21 More recently, though, Robert Stainton has taken a bolder
step. He claims that the missing dimension in discussions of the semantics/pragmatics
boundary is precisely this ethical one. The distinction between an act of ‘full-on stating’
as opposed to mere insinuation—the semantics/pragmatics distinction in other words—
comes down to a difference in moral force. As he puts it, ‘full-on stating has a special
forensic status’ [my emphasis] in that it is a special-purpose device, one function of
which is to make the speech act ‘lie-prone’ (Stainton 2016, pp. 405–6). If he is right,
any discussion of the distinction will be susceptible to support or criticism on ethical
grounds, just as Locke’s theory of personal persistence is. But unlike Locke’s theory, it
19 Clark and Chalmers (1998). For ethical worries, see, e.g., Levy (2007), pp. 59–63.
20 See, e.g., contributions to Szabo (2005) and Stojanovic (2008).
21 Saul (2012), Chs. 2–3. Saul ultimately denies the existence of a morally significant lying/misleading
distinction.
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is something of a surprise that the notion of asserting should be noise-like in this way,
rather than sound-like.
We can see now why dismissiveness towards the Locke counterexample to across-
the-board naturalism (that it is ‘not really metaphysics’) will not do. While Locke’s
explicit use of the word ‘forensic’ could be used to argue that he is openly and
deliberately doing ethics, in the other cases, the core notions were not foreseen to be
forensic and may well turn out not to be so. This demonstrates that, for at least some
philosophical concepts, we cannot always know whether it is best to treat them as
noise-like or as sound-like and hence whether a naturalistic or forensic conception of
their status is most appropriate. Responding to cases like the semantics/pragmatics
boundary or the extended-mind thesis by insisting that they and any others that crop up
are not really metaphysics would mean across-the-board naturalism has collapsed into
the unhelpful thesis that philosophy is best approached naturalistically (and hence non-
forensically) unless it is not best so approached. Of any particular case, we would not
know whether to dismiss a moral challenge.
8 A Pluralist Alternative
Short of giving up one of the working assumptions, it seems we need an alternative to
the two across-the-board options. Since these are the only two options compatible with
the biconditional arrived at in Section 5 (roughly: naturalism about metaphysics if and
only if moral immunity for metaphysics), we also need to revisit that. In this section, I
will show how, by abandoning the letter but not the spirit of the biconditional, an
attractive form of naturalism about metaphysics comes available. It makes good sense
of the existence of what I will henceforth call forensic metaphysical theories (i.e.
theories whose raison d’etre, whether or not this is recognized by their proponents,
has to do with what they tell us about something in the ethical domain) but it does not
require us to jettison naturalism across the board or to violate any of the working
assumptions.
Let us start with the biconditional. We have already dropped the pretence that there
is just one kind of naturalism. Now it is time to drop the pretence that one single
approach should be taken to all metaphysical theories. Metaphysics does not have to be
treated as an undifferentiated bloc, all or none of it an extension (in specified respects)
of science, and all or none of it immune to moral refutation. Locke’s theory and the
other examples in Section 7 suggest that different kinds of metaphysics can co-exist.
Not all ways of dividing up the world have to serve the singular ambitions of
fundamental science, with categories tailored accordingly. When those ambitions are
to the fore, we should indeed see the relevant theory as immune to moral refutation. But
that fact is compatible with a new, more nuanced formulation of the biconditional: of
any given metaphysical theory, it has moral immunity if and only if it is an extension of
science.
In the rest of this section, I defend this new formulation of the biconditional, along
with the pluralist view of metaphysics it permits, a view that treats some metaphysical
theories as forensic (and so potentially susceptible to moral refutation) and others as
non-forensic (and so immune to moral refutation). There is really only one barrier to
accepting such a view, but it is a significant one.
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The difficult emerges once we drop yet another pretence: that talking of a forensic
metaphysical theory as ethics-oriented somehow implies that it is not also science-
oriented. In reality, forensic theories face both ways. Locke’s view rests on empirical
assumptions about the integrity of memory and consciousness in ordinary circum-
stances. The extended-mind thesis grows out of functionalism, still the dominant
explanatory framework in cognitive psychology. And as my brief summary indicated,
even if the semantic/pragmatic distinction is in part an ethical project, contributions to
that project will need to pay heed to findings in theoretical linguistics. Forensic
metaphysical theories, then, have both ethical ambitions and empirical roots, with
success overall requiring success on both fronts. This Janus-like character creates a
problem. If a forensic metaphysical theory is undermined because of an apparent ethical
inadequacy, why does this not translate (by hypothetical syllogism) into evidence
against its scientific ground, i.e. into a moral refutation of science, in violation of
working assumption 1?
To rid ourselves of this worry, we can set aside non-forensic metaphysical theories
(including, presumably, most theories in the philosophies of physics, biology, etc.),
since the worry only arises for forensic ones. For forensic metaphysical theories,
however, we need a clearer model than we currently have of how they can be both
ethics-facing and science-facing without thereby licencing moral refutations of science.
The alternative model I propose turns on an essential feature of non-derived (a
priori) ethical claims: they are, or yield, conditional propositions that allow us to derive
applied ethical claims from claims about the physical world. Without such conditionals,
applied ethics would be groundless and a priori ethics would be pointless. The idea that
normative ethics should supply conditionals with worldly propositions in their ante-
cedents and practical imperatives in their consequents is a familiar one.22 It is also
implicit in my explanation of science’s moral immunity (see Fig. 2 in Section 4): non-
derived ethics is needed to licence any inference from scientifically credible claims (the
antecedents of the conditionals) to derived ethical judgements (their consequents).
Despite this familiarity, we would be hard pushed to specify ‘if-then’ statements with
antecedents expressed in the language of some foundational branch of science and
consequents stating clear practical directives. The sheer intractability of such a proposal
is obvious. There have to be stepping stones along the way, breaking the journey. On
what I will call the stepping stone model of forensic metaphysics, forensic metaphysics
sits on this long conditional pathway, mediating between science and both parts of
ethics.
The easiest way to conceive of this model is in terms of its applicability outside
philosophy. Concepts such as noisy, danger, table, drunk-driver, chaste, or risk sit on
this same pathway, providing us with ‘stepping stones’ midway between the physical
sciences and the outputs of practical reasoning. Unless they are given artificially precise
definitions, these concepts have unwieldy or loose physical application conditions; but
they are better adapted for use in practical reasoning than they could possibly be if they
22 Utilitarians, for example, offers a single conditional schema: if current circumstances are such that Ø-ing
would promote utility, then one ought to Ø. Kant’s maxims, which are what his universalizability test is meant
to evaluate, take the form: if circumstances are such and such, then do this or that. Virtue ethics is less
obviously productive of conditionals, but its promise rests on the thought that circumstance-sensitive decisions
are well taken when they manifest possession of the virtues. So while the virtue approach itself will not always
yield the kinds of conditionals I have in mind here, virtuous individuals operate with them.
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were geared to the explanatory needs of science. Sitting alongside these non-
philosophical concepts, we should not be surprised to find concepts such as person,
rational, meaning, agent causation, freewill, possibility, responsibility, and knowl-
edge—the bread and butter of much metaphysics. To serve as stepping stones, theories
built using these concepts must look ‘backwards’ to science and ‘forwards’ to practical
decisions. They must also be sensitive to the a priori deliverances of the non-
derivational part of ethics. None of this requires that forensic metaphysics is in any
sense a part of science; but nor is it evidentially dissociated from science.23
How, though, does this stepping stone model help us to deal with the threat posed by
forensic metaphysical theories that appear to licence moral refutations of science?
Suppose we are confronted with a metaphysical theory with both empirical roots and
implausible moral implications. As an example, take the extended-mind thesis’s appar-
ently entailing that wiping someone’s personal data is a kind of partial murder, an
entailment that (let us suppose) we find hard to accept. What alternative do we have, on
the stepping stone model, to treating such an implication (by hypothetical syllogism) as
a moral strike against the empirical foundations on which the extended-mind thesis
rests, contrary to working assumption 1?
We in fact have at least four alternatives.
(i) We could embrace the counterintuitive moral consequence, meaning the hypo-
thetical syllogism would not be triggered.
This option is available because the consequence would be derived, and derived moral
claims have no evidence-base beyond their derivability. Option (i) cannot be our only
alternative, though, or the thought that brought down across-the-board naturalism—that
sometimes a metaphysical theory’s moral consequences do undermine its acceptability
(see Section 7)—would also have purchase against this model of forensic metaphysics.
Fortunately, the stepping stone model is compatible with further possibilities.
(ii) We could conclude that, after careful analysis, the metaphysical theory does
not entail the untoward ethical conclusion after all.24
(iii) We could conclude that the metaphysical theory is not adequately rooted in
good science after all.25
(iv) We could conclude that the metaphysical theory meshes poorly with non-
derived ethical knowledge. 26
Are four alternatives enough? Is any number enough? If the worry about Janus-faced
forensic metaphysics had been that it fails to rule out moral refutations of science,
23 The model has affinities with positions defended by others on different grounds, e.g. Sellars (1963), pp. 39–
40; Jackson (1998), Chs. 5–6; Williams (2000); Paul (2012); Thomasson (2017).
24 In the extended-mind case, for example, the entailment might fail because of an ambiguity: the conception
of mind at work in the extended-mind thesis permits unconscious elements of self, whereas the notion of self at
work in ethical contexts is tied to responsible agency and hence to a wholly conscious self.
25 See e.g. Neil Levy’s (2005) response to experiments by Benjamin Libet and others that are sometimes
interpreted as showing that we lack freewill, a potential threat to ordinary assumptions about moral
responsibility.
26 For example, Lewis’s rejection of ‘pure’ utilitarianism in Section 3 above.
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alternative possibilities are beside the point: their existence does not make moral
refutations of science impossible. That, however, was not the worry. We have already
accepted that moral refutations of science cannot happen (i.e. working assumption 1, a
brief rationale for which was given in note 12). Our task is to show that the stepping
stone model does not entail their possibility. The existence of alternative possibilities
undermines any such entailment.
In sum, the pluralist view divides metaphysical theories into two camps. Purely
science-facing, non-forensic metaphysical theories, including analyses of explanatory
paradigms, interpretations of particular theories, reflections on their mathematical
underpinnings, etc., can be assimilated into science (albeit at a very abstract level).
Given this, they are immune to moral refutation. Forensic metaphysical theories, on the
other hand, are both science-facing and ethics-facing. They act as breakpoints in the
long conditional paths linking science to its practical ethical consequences. This means
they are, potentially anyway, susceptible to moral refutation—but not in a way that
licences moral refutations of the science they presuppose.27
9 Is Metaphysics Immune to Moral Refutation?
The answer to this paper’s title question turns out to be neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’ but rather
‘it all depends’. This is less disappointing than it sounds because we can now say what
it all depends on, and why. As well as dispelling mystery and explaining divergences of
opinion (e.g. the one between Heller and Tännsjö), this new knowledge can help us
towards a verdict in particular cases.
What it depends on, in the first instance, is whether the metaphysical theory is best
categorized as forensic or non-forensic. This will not always be easy to determine. In
Section 7, we saw a couple of examples of philosophical theories the apparently
forensic nature of which was unanticipated. There is an open question here as to how
far we can decide how to categorize any given theory, and how far the appropriate
category is a matter of discovery. While it may seem reasonable that someone should be
free to stipulate their own ambitions, in the fashion of Papineau and Locke, we might
also be tempted by the thought that such categorizations should sometimes be rejected
because they push the theory in an unproductive direction. Either way, we can say that
if the primary purpose of the metaphysical theory is to contribute to empirical enquiry,
then it has moral immunity.
For forensic metaphysical theories, the picture is more complex. What makes it
forensic is its serving as a resting post in the long and otherwise intractable conditionals
linking science to the practical domain. When a piece of forensic metaphysics seems to
have implausible moral consequences, we could be in any one of the four possible
scenarios distinguished in Section 8. In (iii) and (iv), we should change the metaphys-
ical theory; in (i) and (ii), we can make accommodations that do not require such a
change. Deciding whether a metaphysical theory needs to be altered therefore depends
on establishing which scenario one is in. This will often be just as hard as deciding
whether the metaphysical theory is forensic in the first place. In practice, discussions of
27 I am here ignoring the possibility of non-forensic and non-empirical metaphysical theories. Their existence
could be accommodated within a pluralistic approach along lines suggested in note 14.
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metaphysical concepts that arguably have an implicit or explicit forensic aspect,
concepts such as person or agency for example, take place on ever-shifting sands, as
we make definitional and other accommodations in an effort to reach an optimally
coherent position. The question of which scenario we are in, and therefore the question
of whether to revise the metaphysical theory on moral grounds, is one part of the
attempt to find equilibrium. It will be answered only by addressing the particulars of the
case.28 All we can say for sure is that something should always give before an
apparently implausible moral consequence of a metaphysical theory is recruited as
evidence against one of the scientific hypotheses grounding that theory.
10 Conclusion: Lessons for Naturalism
The topic of the moral immunity of metaphysics was introduced with a question (‘To
what extent and in what respects should philosophy assimilate itself to science?’) and a
promise: that we can make progress on this question by considering moral immunity.
So, what have we learned about philosophical naturalism in the course of thinking
about the moral immunity of science and metaphysics?
The key lesson to draw is that we need not, indeed should not, insist on a one-size-
fits-all approach to the status of metaphysics vis-à-vis science. It is perfectly possible
for us to be insistent empiricists in some domains and conceptual jugglers, driven by a
priori and practical considerations, in others.
Consideration of moral immunity also helps us to see that this pluralist approach is a
more authentic species of naturalism than one that insists we always disregard non-
empirical considerations. Naturalism in philosophy, characterized very broadly, is a
matter of having a high regard for empirical enquiry as a defeasible route to knowledge,
together with an open-minded willingness to go wherever this high regard takes us in
our philosophy. Controversy takes root as soon as we try to pin this down further, but a
healthy ‘high regard’ must exclude not only distain for science but also sycophancy
towards it. Naturalism in philosophy implies, then, at least three dispositions:
An active willingness to learn from science
A concern not to pass oneself off as doing science when one is not
A desire not to interfere inappropriately in science’s ways
A naturalism that insists on all legitimate metaphysics being somehow assimilable to
science would violate the second and third of these dispositions. Or rather, it would do
so if we recognize that metaphysics can have legitimate forensic ambitions (as it seems
we should). Many non-philosophical concepts, such as noisy and dangerous, are replete
with evaluative significance, suiting them to what I called a stepping stone role, but
undermining their use in science. The same seems to be true of many metaphysical
concepts, such as person, semantic/pragmatic, freewill, agent causation, meaning,
rational, and possibility.
28 The kind of dancing involved is nicely illustrated by discussions of whether collectives are agents in a sense
that is required for us to be able to hold them to account (e.g. Isaacs 2011).
Is Metaphysics Immune to Moral Refutation?
Of course, supporters of a strong assimilationist reading of naturalism can respond
by saying that such metaphysical concepts need to be re-engineered, divested of their
empirically unhelpful ‘legacy’ features, including any forensic features. That is what
‘naturalizing’ philosophy requires, which is why naturalism is such a radical position.
Biologists have refitted the ordinary concept altruism into a scientifically useful term of
art devoid of moral overtones, so why can philosophers not do the same? But apart
from the damage such refits do to the capacity of the revised notion to play its original
and valuable forensic role, empirical success using this kind of conceptual exaptation is
likely to be coincidental rather than the rule.
It is easier to respect all three dispositions if we adopt the pluralist view on which
some metaphysics has a forensic element while some does not. Both types should be
accountable to science. Even forensic metaphysics has scientific feet. But the ethics-
facing aspect of forensic metaphysics means we should avoid seeing it as any kind of a
contribution to or part of science. In practice, this means we need to find a way of ring-
fencing science from moral refutation. This is possible if we accept that the purpose of
some metaphysical theories is to mediate the long conditional inferences from science
to practical decision-making. None of this bars us from describing non-forensic
metaphysics as an extension of science, so long as other consideration in the naturalism
debate call on us to do so.
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